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Bulletin de l'APAD
Like chameleons. Civil servants and
corruption in Malawi
Gerhard Anders
"The making of rules and social and symbolic
order is a human industry matched only by the
manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing,
and unmaking of rules in which people seem
almost equally engaged." Sally Falk Moore 1
"To effectively combat corruption in Malawi to
attain a corruption‑free environment for good
governance and development for the benefit for ail
the people of Malawi" Mission statement of the
Anti‑Corruption Bureau.
"In the civil service you have to know how to
manoeuvre." Senior civil servant in Malawi.
"Bwana ‑ zimakukomerani ife tikatuwa, pa lunch
hour tikuwerenga manyuzi, kuyenda bawo inu
muli ndi mahule, muku njoya mukukadya ku
Ryall's" 2 Lucius and Zembani Band, "Njoka mu
udzu" (1999).
1 While doing fieldwork in Malawi in 1999 and 2000 I often had to marvel at the apparent
ease with which civil servants managed their widely branching networks; bridging huge
differences in social position and location, negotiating virtuously a course between their
own interests, the claims of spouses, children and kin and the public office. They seemed
to be always on the move : between the office, the garden where they grew maize, private
businesses, relatives coming to see them and they themselves visiting family in the home
village, switching effortlessly between the different codes and signs of these networks
and locations. They reminded me of chameleons, apparently slow, inscrutable, their eyes
always in motion, scanning independently from each other in an directions, changing
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their colours according to the environment in order to make them invisible to their
enemies, yet never losing sight of their aims. 3
2 This paper deals with one particular aspect of civil servants' social lives that has received
a  lot  of  attention  in  recent  years  by  the  international  donor  community  and  social
scientists  alike :  corruption.  More  by  default  than by  design I  came into  touch with
corruption, which has become a common phenomenon in the bureaucracy of Malawi and
has a prominent place in public discourse. My scope was much wider : my research was
primarily aimed at analysing civil servants' social networks and forms of support within
this social networks. Hence, I hope that this problematic normative concept did not bias
the analysis of my informants'  behaviour. Often corruption is just one, often min or,
aspect of civil servants' social lives. In my point of view it is important to make this very
clear at the outset of my paper to avoid stereotypical representations of parasitic and
corrupt African civil servants that skew the analysis of more complex social interactions.
3 In Malawi, as in most African countries, networks based on affectionate ties, for example
kinship, are extensive and very strong. Relationships with others usually convey strong
moral imperatives, a sense of obligation and entail certain expectations. In the context of
a very small formal sector civil servants are special. They enjoy a regular salary, various
benefits and have direct access to the state's resources. They have a privileged position in
comparison to the overwhelming majority of the population eking out an existence by
subsistence farming, piecework or small‑scale business. Their privileged position makes
them a prime target for relatives 100 king for help, especially under the present adverse
economic conditions in Malawi (Anders 2002a). Many of the civil servants have talked to
have a strong sense of obligation and find it very difficult to refuse a request for help by a
relative,  even  if  doing  so  would  entail  the  violation  of  office  regulations.  This  is
exacerbated by the intensity of social control : non‑compliance with kinship obligations
carries the threat of serious sanctions, such as ostracism and witchcraft, ufiti, while the
chances of being charged with corruption are relatively slim. But it would be wrong to
assume that civil  servants are merely responding to the demands of  an "uncaptured
peasantry" (Hyden 1980). On the contrary, holding a public office gives them access to
resources, which they can exploit as brokers 4 also to their own advantage. The ambiguity
and tension, which is created by the co‑existence and conflict of different normative
orders,  is  exploited  by  civil  servants  who  cunningly  adapt  to  their  environment  to
maximise their profit and to protect or improve their position.
4 Therefore I  would like to approach corruption from a different angle,  not as deviant
behaviour but rather embedded in a society where the modern division between the
public office and the private is not the exclusive manner of defining a civil servant's place
in social space. State law is only one of the multiple sets of rules operating within the civil
service  of  Malawi.  Social  obligations  based  on  affectionate  affiliation  like  kinship  or
patron‑client relationships have a strong influence on people's social lives. Within the
civil  service,  clandestine  rules  and  principles  exist  parallel  to  official  rules  and
regulations. Civil servants are exposed to these various sets of rules and try to maintain
their position in the civil service, the extended family and patronage networks with their
conflicting claims and obligations. This co‑existence and interaction of multiple sets of
rules within the bureaucracy can best be described in terms of legal pluralism. To begin
with I will discuss what the word corruption refers to and how it is used in Malawi. The
perception of corruption in Malawi has been shaped by the political and socio‑economic
changes the country has been experiencing since its democratisation in the mid‑1990s.
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The main part of the paper will deal with the connection between legal pluralism and
corruption within the civil service of Malawi drawing on a case study of a senior civil
servant negotiating the claims of the different sets of rules. The case study will serve as a
point of reference for a more general analysis of the interplay of different sets of rules
within the state bureaucracy, which draws on the concept of legal pluralism.
5 The idea of a public office separate from an official's private affairs, the basis for the
definition  of  corrupt  behaviour,  is  a  relatively  recent  concept  firmly  rooted  in  the
Western political and philosophical tradition. Until the 19th century it was common in
Europe and its colonies to see the public office as private property. Many practices, which
were  perfectly  legitimate  in  earlier  times,  would  qualify  today  as  corruption  or
patronage. The distinction between the public office and private affairs only gained hold
in  Europe  during  a  long  gradual  process,  which  culminated  with  the  advent  of  the
Weberian model  of  bureaucracy (Scott  1979;  Weber  1980/1921 ;  Wertheim 1964).  The
argument of relativity does not only apply to comparisons across time but even today
there  exist  considerable  differences  in  regard  to  what  qualifies  as  illegal  corruption
between different countries despite the globalised discourse on corruption and how to
deal with it. In recent scholarly writing different definitions of the phenomenon have
been suggested. 5 Despite all differences most authors acknowledge a couple of common
features. Virtually all definitions are centred on the misuse of the public office for private
ends (Epko 1979 : 3, Gardiner 2002). Authors who have recently written on corruption
have largely abandoned the attempt to arrive at a detailed yet universal definition and
use  a  pragmatic  and broad  definition  instead.  They  simply  define  corruption as  the
misuse of the public office for private gains thus attaining a definition that is flexible and
open enough to account for the specific circumstances of a situation (See e.g. Olivier de
Sardan 1999,  Harsch 1999).  This broad definition covers a whole range of  illegal  and
semi‑legal practices : bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, fraud, use of the public
office to exert influence, "favours" for friends and relatives, etc. Under corruption in this
broad sense fall also patronage and nepotism, either illegal or semi‑legal, when they are
connected to the public office.
6 In  spite  of  this  quite  extensive  definition  two differentiations  need  extra  attention :
firstly,  with respect  to  the  nature  of  the  exchange relationships  and,  secondly,  with
regard to the scale. Scott makes a distinction between market corruption and parochial
corruption : the first is defined as an impersonal exchange of money between an official
and those who can pay while the second denotes "a situation where only ties of kinship,
affection, caste and so forth, determine access to the favours of power holders" (Scott
1979 : 43‑45). This distinction is important since it draws attention to the existence of
roles of kinship, friendship, etc, which are based on a different morality than state law.
However,  both  forms  of  corruption  often  overlap  considerably :  even  if  one  has  the
necessary money he still has to know who to bribe and how to do it "properly" and it is
not uncommon that a service for a relative also has a pecuniary aspect.
7 Bayart points out that "contrary to the popular image of the innocent masses, corruption
and predatoriness are not found exclusively amongst the powerful" (1993 : 238). Indeed,
one of the common characteristics of corruption in Sub‑Saharan Africa is that it is not
restricted to  a  specific  class  or  group of  people.  Blundo and Olivier  de  Sardan have
recently  emphasized  the  importance  of  "la  petite  corruption  quotidienne"  for  an
understanding  of  the  functioning  of  the  state  bureaucracy  in  an  empirical  study
conducted in francophone West‑Africa (2001a). Generally, grand corruption can be easily
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distinguished  from  petty  corruption.  Grand  corruption  is  practised  by  presidents,
ministers, Principal Secretaries and Secretaries and involves huge sums of money paid as
kick‑backs or "commissions". Petty corruption involves police officers at a road‑block,
the clerk or the messenger at the District Administration demanding an extra payment,
store clerks selling stationery, school‑masters selling exercise books and drivers using
government vehicles for private business. Despite the obvious differences between grand
and petty corruption in terms of scale and actors it makes sense to perceive of them as
two extremes "on a continuum of forms of corruption" (Olivier de Sardan 1999 : 250).
8 Since  1994  corruption  has  become  a  hotly  debated  issue  in  Malawi  and  everybody
including civil  servants themselves can relate stories of the greed and inefficiency of
public  servants.  The  fight  against  corruption  in  Malawi  in  its  present  form  is  a
phenomenon of the late 1990s and is linked to the country's transition to multi‑party
democracy. The new president, Bakili Muluzi, was elected in the first free elections in
1994  and  re‑elected  in  1999.  The  new  government  and  parliament  took  several
anti‑corruption measures, often under considerable donor pressure. In 1995 parliament
passed the Corrupt Practices Act and in 1998 the donor‑funded Anti‑Corruption Bureau
became  operation  al.  This  policy  is  a  direct  product  of  the  promotion  of  "good
governance" by the World Bank, the IMF and the international donor community (e.g.
World  Bank  2000a,  2000b).  And  indeed  these  efforts  to  fight  corruption  seem to  be
necessary.  All  informants I  talked to,  not  only civil  servants,  stress  that  before 1994
corruption was virtually unknown in Malawi. People often express sentimental feelings
for the "good old time" under Kamuzu Banda, Malawi's autocratic ruler between 1964 and
1994, when crime and corruption were rare exceptions and when people got their jobs in
the government on grounds of their qualifications and not because of their connections
to senior civil servants and politicians. Popular discourse draws a clear line between the
period under Banda's rule with no corruption, on the one hand, and the time since 1994
under the democratically elected Bakili Muluzi with widespread corruption, on the other
hand. In my view it is impossible to discharge of this discrepancy by the simple assertion
that people always idealise a better past in contrast to a harsh present. The general firm
consensus on this point requires clarification. But limited available space forces me to
merely indicate contributing factors.
9 Firstly, corrupt behaviour has often become a matter of survival. Malawi has been in the
grip of economic decline since 1982, which has turned into a full‑blown economic crisis
since the early 1990s, when free‑market reforms were being implemented by the World
Bank and the IMF. Inflation has constantly eroded civil servants' salaries : in 1992 the real
value of basic salaries was about 50% below the levels of 1982 (World Bank 1994 : 37‑39).
Due to currency devaluations and high inflation rate this trend has intensified since 1994
6.  Poverty  is  widespread,  endemic  illnesses  such  as  HIV/AIDS  and  malaria  produce
staggering mortality rates and civil  servants are not only confronted with their own
social decline but also by more demands on their resources from impoverished relatives
and  friends.  Furthermore  there  is  growing  discontent  about  the  glaring  income
differences between them and functionaries of donor agencies and NGOs who do the same
job and have the same qualifications but who earn several times the salary of a civil
servant  7.  Consequently,  civil  servants  often  refer  to  their  meagre  salaries  as  a
justification and explanation of corrupt behaviour.
10 Secondly, since the introduction of multi‑party democracy, matipati, in 1994 the media
and people talk more freely about corruption than in the past. Under Banda strict control
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and arbitrary arrests of "confusionists" and "separatists" created a culture of paralysis
and fear. Now newspapers have more leeway to address corruption and people dare to
talk more openly about misconduct of public officials. This is something unheard of under
Banda's rule. Therefore I tentatively conclude that corrupt behaviour which might have
occurred prior to democratisation was just not talked about in public or even in private.
11 Thirdly, the impact of donor funded programmes to promote human rights and "good
governance" has influenced the shift in public perception and contributed to the more
open discussion  of  corruption  just  mentioned.  In  the  past  practices  perceived  to  be
corrupt were considered just  a part  of  the political  system. In fact,  there existed no
boundaries between Kamuzu Banda's personal property, the ruling party MCP (Malawi
Congress Party,  the only legal  party till  1994) and the state institutions.  As a retired
district commissioner put it : "when the district officer of the MCP wanted to borrow your
tractor  you  couldn't  refuse,  could  you   ?"  This  has  changed  considerably  since
democratisation  in  1994  and  politicians  and  functionaries  are  often  accused  of
corruption. As a matter of fact,  politicians routinely accuse each other of corruption,
corruption allegations have become part of political power struggles (Englund 2002). It is
important  to  take  these  changes  into  account  in  order  to  avoid  an  ahistorical  and
therefore flawed analysis. A study that is sensitive of social and cultural peculiarities has
to take the specific historical background into account. Especially, with regard to Malawi
this is crucial since the country used to be considered to be one of the least corrupt
countries in sub‑Saharan Africa.
12 In everyday conversations people quite frequently use the English word but in a very
broad sense, covering corruption in the legal sense of the term, i.e. bribery, and all kinds
of  illicit  practices  like  fraud,  theft,  embezzlement,  etc.  In  everyday  conversations,
newspaper reports, official documents and statements by politicians, practices denoted
with the English word corruption are invariably condemned as something poisonous that
has to be eradicated or stamped out. However, the general rejection of "Corruption" does
not imply a clear and unequivocal rejection of practices considered to be corrupt among
average Malawians if we investigate the vernacular. 8
13 In many conversations people use the Chichewa word katangale. Katangale denotes any
kind of illegal, dubious or shady de al or practice connected to the place of work or the
office in the formal sector that serve the enrichment of the employee.  Katangale also
covers nepotism and patronage since the two practices will often be connected. When
people  refer  to  corruption  by  the  English  word  they  generally  express  their  strong
disapproval and rejection. On the other hand, when they refer to katangale they are more
ambiguous. Although people do not approve of it they will often talk about it in a rather
ironic fashion acknowledging the fact that it is an intrinsic aspect of formal employment.
The meaning depends on the intonation. Katangale is not so much an individualist action
but rather an aspect of "the system" or "the way of doing things". The perception is that
katangale is not an act of a person's free will but rather something he or she is drawn into,
it appears as something you do because "that is the way how things are done around
here", a system that does not really leave you an alternative way of doing things.
14 Katangale has strong redistributive connotations and is linked to the notion of "sharing",
kugawa or kugawira. If others benefit from katangale the corrupt behaviour is considered
to be acceptable and morally right. If the perpetrator of katangale violates the obligation
to share people who expected their share will find ways to take revenge or punish the
wrongdoer. Moreover, katangale is characterized by its secrecy. In this sense the concept
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resonates with witchcraft, ufiti, which is also characterized by secrecy and perceived to be
something  that  can  be  beyond  human  agency.  If  katangale  is  used  in  a  negative
non‑redistributive  way  it  is  often  linked  to  practices  of  ufiti.  Katangale  is  clearly
differentiated from theft, kuba. Theft is an individual action for one's own benefit. Kuba 
does  not  evoke  the  redistributive  associations  of  katangale,  kuba  is  always  strongly
rejected as wrongful act.  Kuba is  legally and morally wrong and it  can be in no way
justified. For example, in the markets it is common practice that a thief who is caught
red‑handed is subjected to spontaneous mob‑justice that often results in the death of the
thief.  Aside  from  the  unequivocal  disapproval  of  theft  this  example  also  highlights
another  distinction :  kuba  is  usually  an  open  act,  normally  not  associated  with  the
supernatural or magical as katangale can be, especially if it is used in a negative sense.
These observations regarding the concept of katangale indicate that the attitude towards
the use of the public office for "private" ends is more complicated and multi‑layered than
the state legislation and regulations seem to suggest.
15 In order to understand the existence of corruption in Malawi it is necessary to address
the co‑existence of different sets of norms or legal pluralism within the bureaucracy. In
other words,  adherence to one set of  norms may contribute to or entail  violation of
another one. Official rules prohibit bribery and corrupt practices but do not account for
the extensive obligations  towards  kin,  for  example.  In  turn,  kinship or  patron‑client
relationships  have  no  separate  rules  concerning  the  distinction  between  public  and
private; the civil servant is expected to grant access to all resources he controls or is
thought to control to kith and kin. This discrepancy has contributed to the development
of an informal clandestine set of rules among civil servants which is different from other
rules such as official regulations and kinship obligations.
16 State law and civil service regulations co‑exist with rules of kinship and other personal
relationships. Most authors writing on the subject have acknowledged the existence of
normative pluralism in regard to corruption in countries of the South. Olivier de Sardan,
for example, points out that 'the functioning of the administrative apparatus, entirely
copied from a European pattern, is schizophrenic in type. In law, official functioning and
budget, it is totally occidental. In practice, it is otherwise, traversed by logics in drastic
contradiction with the original model. Thus, what is considered to be corruption from the
perspective  of  official  norms  is  not,  or  seldom,  viewed  in  the  same  light  from  the
perspectives of practical norms and actual practices (1999 : 263). This is the reason why in
the civil service 'very widespread adherence to abstract official norms of European origin,
which advocate  the  impartiality  of  the  state  and the  necessity  of  an ethic  of  public
interest,  thus  coexists  peacefully  with  an  equally  prevalent  pattern  of  behaviour  in
conformity with social norms that favour personal and partisan interests (ibid.).
17 This contradiction is more than a discrepancy between norms and practices but should be
analysed in  terms of  a  contradiction between different  sets  of  norms (Médard 1995,
Olivier de Sardan 1999 : 263). State law is just one of many sets of rules within a social
field or context, interacting and overlapping with customary law, religious law or other
forms of informal rules.9 A social  field is  defined as a smaller unit within a complex
society "with rule‑making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance."
This field, however, is not completely independent from outside influences; it possesses
only semi‑autonomy. Thus external rules usually co‑exist with the internal rules in a
process  of  continuous  change  and  interaction  with  each  other  (Moore  1973).  To
conceptualise the civil service as a semi‑autonomous social field allows us to distinguish
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and to analyse the various sets of norms, which create a situation of legal pluralism in
regard to corrupt behaviour of public officials.
18 Rules as such are abstract and do not interact themselves. Social actors, people, interact
with each other and in doing so they use rules as a resource to define their position and
to achieve their objectives (Galanter 1981). Civil servants are very adept in navigating
their course through the normative plurality and the other social actors. They suffer and
profit at the same time from conflicting norms. On the one hand, they often are caught in
"catch‑22 situations" since whatever they do will result in a violation of a rule : if you
help your brother you might have to violate official regulations but if you do not help him
you run the risk of undermining kinship solidarity. On the other hand, civil servants use
this very position as a resource and as brokers, they will always make sure that they get
their share, either by profiting themselves or improving their status and position in their
respective networks.
19 As mentioned above corruption was not the focus of my research during fieldwork. I
concentrated  on  forms  of  social  support  involving  civil  servants  and  the  ways  they
combine and negotiate their roles as public officials and members of a family, a circle of
friends, a neighbourhood, a church or a burial association. Obviously, in the course of
exploring these issues I could not avoid this hot topic, which everybody, including civil
servants themselves, associated with the civil service. However, it is extremely difficult to
actually see acts of corruption and to establish their connection with obligations towards
kin or patron‑client relationships. 
20 People are often not willing to talk about concrete cases of corruption, a lot of stories are
hearsay, a white researcher arouses suspicion and everything is shrouded in secrecy and
allusions. The researcher who informs directly about corruption will only get the general
rumours he or she can also find in the papers but no details on interfaces with informal
networks and the influence of social obligations.
21 For these reasons I do not agree completely with authors who want to study the state by
addressing corruption. Of course, a thick description of corrupt practices will tell us a lot
about the state, how it works and how it is perceived. But that is exactly the problem. It is
very difficult to get a good view on corruption and the situations it occurs in since these
practices are usually conducted in a sphere of secrecy and confidentiality. Instead I argue
that any in‑depth study on the social lives of public officials would tell us a good deal
about both, the state and corruption. I came by chance to the most valuable information,
often indirectly when talking about other issues. The information I eventually gathered
resembles more a puzzle with many separate pieces, which eventually give a fairly good
general picture but I have few cases where I could witness the whole complex of practices
and conflicting rules that forms the context of corruption in Malawi. One of the most
complete cases is described in the following. The name of the civil servant is fictive to
protect  his  identity and I  do not disclose place names,  the department or any other
information, which might reveal the identities of the people involved. 
22 Mr. Mashanga was a senior civil servant. In his early forties he was at the height of his
career, Administrative officer in the Superscale. It was amazing to see how he handled his
superior officers, subordinates, relatives, clients and all kinds of relationships including
that with a European PhD‑student. Like a chameleon he switched effortlessly between
codes and environments, talking a very learned and bookish English at one moment and
within a split  second putting a subordinate or client at ease with a funny remark in
Chichewa. He had contacts everywhere, from the patrons of seedy bottle‑stores in town
Like chameleons. Civil servants and corruption in Malawi
Bulletin de l'APAD, 23-24 | 2006
7
to the highest officials in the civil service. He could arrange almost anything and his
subordinates  would  react  on  the  wink  of  a  finger.  Everywhere  he  was  greeted  with
respect  and  although he  did  not  belong  to  the  highest  echelons  of  power  he  could
mobilise an impressive network and certainly had a high social status.
23 He lived in large house provided by the government. His wife, who had also been a civil
servant, had passed away a year ago and he lived together with his son and a number of
relatives and dependants, some of them in the main house, others in servants' quarters.
Two of the younger ones attended school in town. Ail  of them depended on him for
accommodation, school fees, food and hoped to find employment through his contacts in
the civil service. He had enjoyed a good education at a missionary boarding school and
had graduated from the University of Malawi in 1985. His father had been a primary
school teacher and had made quite an effort to ensure that his son would get a good
education. Being a Chewa from Kasungu district in the Central region he had probably
benefited  from Banda's  policy  to  pro  vide  better  access  to  university  education and
employment in the civil service for the AChewa, his own ethnic group and power base 10.
Mr.  Mashanga had joined the service in the late 1980s as Administrative Officer,  the
entrance grade for people with a university degree. Later he had served on different posts
where he distinguished himself as able administrator and a good leader who had both,
the respect of his superior officers and the loyalty of his subordinates. Swiftly he moved
up the promotional ladder to the post he had already held for a few years when I met
him.
24 Mr. Mashanga employed a housekeeper who lived together with his wife, his children and
his mother in one of the servants' quarters on Mr. Mashanga's compound. Although the
housekeeper worked in the household and was paid wages it would be inadequate to
describe their relationship only in terms of an employment contract. Their relationship
resembled more a patron‑client relationship between relatives. They were very close; the
housekeeper had worked for him for more than ten years. One day in December this
relationship was put on the test when the mother of the housekeeper died unexpectedly
of malaria. The housekeeper turned to Mr. Mashanga, his patron or bwana, for support.
The housekeeper told me that he simply had no one else who could help him since he and
his family were poor and the home village far away. He was the only one of his family who
was employed in town, his relatives were subsistence farmers and they expected him to
arrange the transport of his mother and the funeral in the home village. In turn, he
expected Mr. Mashanga would help him because he was his patron whom he had always
served loyally and who generally was considered to be a good man looking after his
dependants.
25 Mr.  Mashanga really wanted to help his  housekeeper who was obviously very upset.
When I asked for his motivation he responded that his housekeeper was like a relative to
him and that he had served him well. Thus he felt obliged to help him. Yet, he faced
several  difficulties  in  helping  the  housekeeper.  First  of  ail,  there  was  no  transport
available. His own car had been grounded for a couple of months. It had a motor problem
and the necessary spare part was not available in Malawi and anyway, he could not afford
a replacement at the moment since the spare part would cost him at least two months
salary. Prices for spare parts had rocketed in the past months due to the high inflation
rate of more than 30%. But even if his car would have been operational it would not have
been really suitable for the transport of a corpse and the family members attending the
funeral in the home village. When I suggested that he could rent a pick‑up he said that
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that was not possible because it would be far too expensive. He would try to arrange for
vehicles from the office. That was the easiest and cheapest option as he assured me.
26 But it also seemed to be a somewhat illegal option, too. According to the Malawi Public
Service  Regulations  (MPSR)  (Supplement  1 :  192.1,  192.2)  the  government  provides  a
coffin and vehicles to transport the body and the guests to the place of burial only for the
civil  servant him‑  or  herself  or  a  civil  servant's  family member living at  the service
station. Despite their apparent rigidity even official regulations leave some leeway since
it is not defined who exactly qualifies as a family member living at the service station. In
a  typical  civil  servant's  household,  where  distant  relatives  often  stay  for  weeks  or
months, this border is often difficult to draw. Stretching the meaning and with a little bit
of goodwill even a nephew or cousin on a visit could be considered to be a 'family member
living at the service station' as long as there was some kin relation and the relative died
at  the  service  station.  In  Mr.  Mashanga'  s  case  the  situation  was  a  little  bit  more
complicated.  Although  his  housekeeper  had  worked  for  him  a  long  time  and  was
considered by Mr. Mashanga to be a relative, abwale, he would not qualify as a member of
family in terms of the Malawi Public Service Regulations (MPSR), which do not recognise
fictive kinship.
27 During an earlier meeting he had told me that "everything concerning the civil service is
in there [i.e. the MPSR]" but when I asked him whether it was against the rules to get the
government vehicles for the funeral  of  his housekeeper's mother he replied that the
official regulations "existed only on paper", the real problem was whether the vehicle
would be available or away on other, more urgent, business. And indeed, I later heard
that he had arranged not only one but two cars with drivers within a day. After the
funeral in the village the drivers had stayed overnight in a trading centre nearby since it
was  already  too  late  to  return  to  town.  Probably  they  even  received  a  subsistence
allowance for this overnight stay. This would mean that the trip had been classified as
official duty and that the drivers had received a reward since allowances usually exceed
real costs. It would also mean that Mr. Mashanga was able to avoid to pay the drivers for
their  services  himself.  By  using  government  resources  he  utilised  the  possibility  to
minimise costs for himself. In the end he only had to pay condolence money which was
about 10% of his monthly salary, still a considerable sum of money. This money was used
by his housekeeper to cover the other costs of the funeral such as food and drinks for the
guests.
28 Yet, the attitude that the rules exist only in the book did not result in their complete
disregard.  On  the  contrary,  all  involved  followed official  procedures;  Mr.  Mashanga
submitted a request for the vehicles, the superior officer who signed the transport order,
the executive officer who countersigned it and the drivers who filled in their logbooks.
This seems to imply a contradiction since the rules were not applied in regard to the
question whether he was entitled to use the cars.  At  that point another set  of  rules
outside the realm of the office was invoked, i.e. Mr. Mashanga's obligations towards his
housekeeper.  At the office everybody fully understood that he had to fulfil  his social
obligations and the impossibility to refuse the request by referring to official regulations.
As patron the employer has a responsibility not only for the employees but also for family
members. A civil servant who would deny access to the state's resources would appear
selfish and heartless, ubombo. Although employers often complain about this often quite
costly obligation, it  is virtually impossible for them to reject such a request on their
resources since funerals have the highest priority in social life and anybody who appears
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to have no empathy in such a matter would be threatened by ostracism and witchcraft.
Mr. Mashanga' s case illustrates that assistance with a funeral, kutandiza ndimaliro, may
constitute  an  act  of  katangale,  conduct  that  may  be  silently  tolerated  yet  publicly
condemned. Because of the ambiguity of the concept of katangale. Mr. Mashanga's actions
were considered to be unselfish and the right thing to do and were strongly approved by
colleagues  and  outsiders  alike.  Katangale  is  part  of  the  game  and  often  a  necessary
circumvention of rigid bureaucratic rules that are not applicable in the real world, which
is  characterised  by  insecurity  and  unpredictability.  Therefore,  the  expected
redistribution or sharing, kugawa/kugawira justified the transgression of official rules in
Mr. Mashanga's case.
29 The rules of social relationships in regard to funerals differ from official rules. The former
are highly flexible, open for negotiation and determined by the relationships the people
have with each other, while the latter are strict and abstract. This conflict between two
contradicting obligations has to be balanced by a third set of rules ; the pulling of strings
at the office is subject to the rules and principles of the unofficial code of conduct, which
exists parallel to official regulations. Brokerage on behalf of his client had consequences
for the social networks at the office :  he became indebted to his superior officer,  the
driver and in a more indirect way to his colleagues at the department who know about
the improper use of the vehicle. His ability to arrange two cars within a day for a trip far
away gives testimony to his high status and influential position within the department.
Furthermore, considering the ease with which he was able to arrange not only one but
two cars with drivers indicates also that there might have existed a debt on the part of his
superior officer and other colleagues stemming from earlier acts of katangale committed
by  them.  Another  factor  for  the  ease  with  which  he  could  arrange  the  cars  was  a
legitimate reason : everybody understood that a funeral is too important to be avoided by
referring to the official regulations "that only exist on paper" anyway.
30 Still, Mr. Mashanga had to take special care of the interfaces between the official and the
parallel networks. That is the reason why he needed to get the consent of his superior
officer, for example.
31 The relative ease with which Mr. Mashanga was able to circumvent the restrictions of the
civil service regulations does not imply that the official regulations are irrelevant. On the
contrary,  they  are  applied  ‑  albeit  in  a  selective  manner.  If  you have  the  necessary
contacts and relationships of indebtedness with others you can use the unofficial code of
conduct as a resource to get your way and official rules blocking the way melt like snow
in the sun. But in the unfortunate case that you have no contacts or debts official rules
you have never heard of before will be applied to the very letter. Of course someone who
has achieved Mr. Mashanga's position has to have contacts and knowledge to play the
game between official  and parallel  unofficial  rules,  otherwise he would not  have his
present position in the first place. Therefore one often hears about the absurd situation
that someone who is in principle entitled to a service but has no contacts in the office is
driven to despair by the required forms, stamps, signatures and counter‑signatures while
someone who has the influence but is actually not eligible gets the same with the wink of
an eye.
32 The central question that arises from Mr. Mashanga's story is whether his actions were
corrupt  or  not.  We  could  argue  that  they  were  corrupt  since  he  violated  official
regulations. On the other hand, it is clear that the people involved considered his actions
to  be  morally  right.  Therefore  we  can  understand  his  story  as  an  example  of  the
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chameleon's  careful  manoeuvring  between  conflicting  normative  orders,  thereby
drawing on different norms as resources. Simplifying considerably for the sake of clarity I
distinguish three different normative orders. Firstly, the official rules and regulations
regarding corruption, conduct and discipline. Secondly, the principles and rules of social
relationships, primarily kinship and fictive kinship. And thirdly, the internal unofficial
rules within the civil service, i.e. the rules of the bureaucratic semi‑autonomous social
field.  These  rules  are  different  from  official  regulations  which  are  made  by  the
government  and  the  Human  Resources  Department,  they  have  evolved  from  daily
practice  and  often  mediate  between  official  rules  and  external  rules  of  kinship
relationships.
33 To get a better grip on the unofficial rules of the modus operandi within the civil service
one should consider legislation, official regulations and circulars issued by the Secretary
of the President and the Cabinet and the Secretary of Human Resources to be external
rules rather than internal rules since they are generated outside the bureaucracy by a
small group of cabinet ministers and top official of the Office of the President and the
Cabinet and perceived to "exist only in the book" by the rank and file. 11 In recent years
state law has been incorporating a growing body of institutions and rules originating in
the  transnational  realm of  World  Bank  and  IMF policies  on  "good  governance"  and
"combat against corruption" thus adding an extra layer to legal pluralism within the civil
service of Malawi.
34 A senior officer described the Malawi Public Service Regulations (MPSR) as "the bible of
the civil service". This body of rules is supposed to regulate exhaustively the conditions of
service. There have been only two editions, in 1978 and 1991. Since then the provisions
have been altered, updated and supplemented by a vast number of circulars, which are
usually issued by the Secretary of the President and the Cabinet and the Secretary of the
Human Resource  Department.  Despite  all  these  amendments  the  rules,  the  terms  of
service and the structure of the civil  service have basically remained the same since
British colonial rule.12 Specifically in regard to corruption the following institutions and
statutes  are  relevant.  Since  colonial  times  the  Auditor  General's  Office  has  been the
primary department controlling the ministries accounts. This institution has been joined
by the Anti‑Corruption Bureau (ACB), the Department of the Public
35 Prosecutor  and the  Public  Accounts  Committee  of  Parliament  in  the  late  1990s.  The
central legal provisions can be found in the Penal Code and the Corrupt Practices Act of
1995, The latter is the product of the implementation of World Bank and IMF policies on
'good governance' and anti‑corruption.
36 Thus,  state  law and institutions  are  not  a  homogenous system but  in itself  a  rather
heterogeneous  mix  with  different  genealogies  determined  by  changing  geopolitical
constellations :  firstly,  from  independence  in  1964  till  democratisation  in  1993/1994
under  Kamuzu  Banda's  authoritarian  regime  the  highly  centralised  and  hierarchical
structure  of  the  colonial  public  service  was  retained  and  even  strengthened  and,
secondly,  since 1994 there have been feeble attempts to transform the service into a
"right‑sized", "decentralised", "performance‑driven", "transparent", "accountable" and
"efficient"  provider  of  public  services  controlled  by  democratic  institutions  and  the
general public under guidance of the World Bank, the IMF and bilateral donors, As a
result of these demands the government is in the process of implementing a privatisation
programme, a civil service reform programme and a decentralisation programme. 13 In
Malawi the World Bank adopted the so‑called 'enclave approach' to governance reform.
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Hereby new agencies are established that are supposed to function as motors of reform
(Dia 1993), Instead these reforms have not been very successful in transforming the civil
service and reforms co‑exist uneasily with structures dating back to the colonial period.
This situation has resulted in a pluralism of state agencies and legislation. 14
37 Despite the shifts in emphasis basic assumptions about the nature of the civil service
remain unchanged : the division of the public office from private life, the prohibition of
using public resources for private gains, the impartial implementation of public policies
and depersonalised professional relationships 15 Accordingly, the MPSR contain a chapter
on conduct and discipline 16 sanctioning for example the use of information for personal
gain, the use of public monies or property for private purposes, activities which conflict
with the interests of the government or be inconsistent with a civil  servant's official
duties, etc. The MPSR are supplemented by the Corrupt Practices Act (1995), prohibiting
bribery and extortion, and the Penal code, which covers theft and fraud by civil servants.
In addition, numerous circulars of the Secretary of Human Resource Management address
specific problems such as misuse of government vehicles.
38 In spite of the scope of official rules and legislation in reality the risk of discovery and
punishment  for  corrupt  civil  servants  is  very  low.  Of  course  the  President  and  the
ministers are eager to point out that corruption is an evil and that no one stands above
the law. And indeed in recent years several high‑profile scandals involving ministers and
high officials  have led to temporary arrests,  transfers  and suspensions,  But  not  only
grand corruption has been tackled by ACB and the Public Prosecutor, occasionally "small
fish"  such  as  customs  officers  and  clerks  are  persecuted  and  sentenced  to  severe
punishment  if  convicted.  However,  control  by  these  institutions  and the  notoriously
understaffed Auditor General's Office is incidental at best and enforcement of the various
statutes and official regulations seems to be not universal but rather restricted to a few
isolated cases that are supposed to have a deterrent effect or serve political purposes of
political rivals. Furthermore, the rivalry and unclear mandates of these institutions has
counter‑productive  effects :  instead  of  enhancing  anti‑corruption  measures  it  seems
rather to have a paralysing effect. With regard to the effect of sanctions it is difficult to
assume  a  simple  direct  causal  link  between  non‑compliance  and  shortcomings  in
law‑enforcement.  In  any  case,  failing  enforcement  is  certainly  not  conducive  to
law‑abiding  behaviour  by  civil  servants  in  a  bureaucracy  where  self‑enrichment  and
abuse of public property seem to be rather the norm than the exception.
39 Despite "modernisation" and urbanisation,  in most parts of Sub‑Saharan Africa social
networks are vital in regard to people's identity and their social security.  A person's
status is defined to a large degree by the number of personal relationships he or she
entertains and how much of one's wealth is redistributed among kin and clients. Due to
the absence of universal and substantial social welfare services people in general have to
rely for their social security on their networks with kin, colleagues, neighbours, etc. Most
writers have emphasised the role of informal or traditional networks with regard to the
widespread corruption in Sub‑Saharan Africa (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2001a, Médard
1982 : 172 ; 1995 ; Olivier de Sardan 1999 : 256, 257 ; Scott 1979 : 43‑45). Civil servants act
as brokers and patrons within a web of interdependent social networks transcending the
sphere of the public office. This position makes them receptive for the temptation of
corruption. It is almost impossible to refuse the demands of a relative, a friend or an old
schoolmate to assist, even if it means one has to circumvent official rules. 
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40 Generally in Malawi there is a strong moral obligation to redistribute, kugawa or kugawira,
i.e.  to  share,  accumulated  wealth  with  kin.  The  generous  patron  enjoys  considerable
status among his clients. In turn, the connection with a powerful patron enhances the
social status of a client.
41 The  achievement  of  an  individual  is  al  ways  seen  as  a  collective  achievement  by  a
potentially wide circle of relatives, which will grow to the same extent as one moves
upward the social ladder to the extent that the senior civil  servant or the successful
businessman will be visited by 'relatives' he didn't even know existed. It is considered to
be an essential social obligation for kin to support each other and there is always the
implicit threat of ostracism and witchcraft accusations if someone appears to be selfish or
too individualist. Social control within these networks is usually tight and the implicit
threat of witchcraft, ostracism and gossip functions as a sanction inducing conforming
behaviour. 
42 The strength of solidarity networks should not be confused with an idealised picture
where all corrupt behaviour by public officials is a logical consequence of demands for
support. Civil servants are active agents, brokers who continuously negotiate the terms of
their social relationships making sure that they get their share of the cake. Often civil
servants themselves point out that it is no wonder that other officers (of course it were
always others)  are corrupt when they are confronted by the obligations of  extended
families and the limitations of low salaries eroded by inflation. This is often not more
than an excuse for corrupt behaviour; not everybody is the same : some were not corrupt,
others were manipulating and circumventing official rules under severe circumstances
only like Mr and some were downright corrupt without the pretext of social obligations
and  solidarity,  using  the  gains  from  corruption  for  hedonism  and  escapism.  The
numerous  civil  servants  who can be  encountered  in  the  bars  and of  the  urban and
peri‑urban areas where they spend a month's salary in one night give ample testimony of
this selfish and anti‑social aspect of corruption.
43 Civil  servants  maintain  diverse  social  relationships  with  neighbours,  colleagues,  old
schoolmates and fellow members of the church congregation. In an urban and modern
environment other networks based on residence, social status and church membership
are very important. Often the se relationships are described in terms of fictive kinship,
especially  in  regard  to  solidarity.  Yet  one  should  be  careful  to  lump  all  social
relationships and personal exchanges under one header as many authors seem to suggest
(Ekeh 1975; Médard 1982; Olivier de Sardan 1999 ; Scott 1979). Civil servants themselves
often  made  a  distinction  between  kin  and  friends.  Of  course,  relationships  with
neighbours, colleagues and people from the same congregation can be under strain from
demands for support but most civil servants 1 met stressed the pressure from relatives
who expect them to provide support as a major issue of their existence. With regard to
friends my informants often stressed that a friend could put less stronger claims on their
resources. In spite of these complaints their attitude towards expectations by kin is often
ambiguous : on the one hand, exaggerated expectations are perceived to be a burden in
an environment characterised by severe economic crisis and loss of real income ; on the
other hand, the status that comes with the role of a broker and patron is very tempting
and kin relations are seen as insurance, a potential asset which has become increasingly
important in recent years under impact of the economic crisis.
44 When we talk about the rules regulating informal social support it is difficult to represent
them as a normative system of defined rights and obligations. It is rather a cluster of
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basic principles, which order the sphere of personal relationships. Instead of speaking of
rights and duties it seems more appropriate to talk about expectations and feelings of
obligation embedded in social relationships. The feeling of obligation is generally very
strong, it is virtually impossible to reject a demand for support, especially from kin, and
people devise the most complicated schemes to avoid or at least to control the demands
from their relatives. Exchanges are often never fully consumed to maintain a sense of
indebtedness, which leaves open the possibility to ask for favours or services at a later
point of time. Parallel, terms and conditions of exchanges tend to be implicit and vague,
thus leaving space for changes in interpretation and a continuous process of negotiation.
45 For  example,  the  responsibility  of  the  employer  is  not  limited  to  his  employee.  As
employer Mr. Mashanga is expected to support his employees and their families in times
of distress. The employer is generally expected to arrange for or to pay the funeral and
costs of transport of the deceased's body to the place of the funeral, usually the home
village. There is no clear rule since it is neither in the interest of the employer and the
employee to define more precisely who would benefit from the employer's support. Thus
both parties have the possibility to negotiate the conditions of help in the light of the
specific circumstances of the situation. A more precise definition would be considered
undesirable by both parties : the employer wants to avoid to give the impression that he
or she is keen to limit his obligations and it is obviously in the employee's interest to have
as little as possible restrictions on support from the bwana.
46 This  brief  sketch  of  principles  ordering  social  relationships  in  Malawi  seems  to
correspond with Ekeh's concept of the "primordial public realm" as opposed to the "civic
public" associated with colonial rule, which is devoid of moral imperatives 17. He seems to
suggest that a homogenous set of moral imperatives operates in the "primordial public"
and influences the private sphere. In my view, this conceptualisation is misleading : in
general the idea of a primordial realm is anachronistic at best and seems to be inspired by
a search for authenticity rather than social realities in modern Africa. In present‑day
Malawi  there  exists  not  one  universal  morality  but  rather  a  patchwork  of  different
moralities. Often the differences are negligible, as for example between different ethnic
groups who have similar moral imperatives, but sometimes they are considerable. This is
certainly the case in regard to Christian morality and kinship morality, which are often at
odds  and give  rise  to  tension and conflict.  Ekeh asserts  that  "Christian beliefs  have
provided a common moral foundation for the private and the public realms in Western
society" (1975 : 92). His concept of the "primordial public" in Africa, which he primarily
associates  with  kinship  and  ethnicity,  ignores  the  profound  influence  Christian
missionary activities and social change have had on African societies. 18
47 Often  civil  servants  who  are  devout  Christians,  especially  the  rising  number  of
"born‑again" or  "charismatic" Christians,  have high moral  standards in regard to an
individual's  personal  conduct.  Christian  ethics  differ  in  important  aspects  from
kinship‑influenced moral imperatives : Charity is a moral duty for Christians but unlike
solidarity between kin with strong social pressure applied by members of the group the
obligation is  based  on  the  belief  in  god  and  a  hereafter  where  good  deeds  will  be
rewarded  or  bad  deeds  will  be  punished.  Corruption  or  katangale  constitute  sinful
behaviour  and  for  some  charismatic  churches  the  devil  himself  tries  to  seduce  the
believers from the path of god by tempting them to act wrongly. This strong rejection of
illegal acts, which can be traced back to the acknowledgement of secular power in all
Christian  churches  19,  differs  from  kinship  solidarity,  which  does  not  recognise  the
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distinction between public office and private sphere. Hence, it is more appropriate to
replace  the  notion  of  a  "primordial  public"  by  conceptualising  a  mix  of  alternative
moralities which might have conflicting elements. It is possible that the rise of the new
charismatic churches will have a more profound effect on ethics in the civil service than
all official programmes for "good governance" together.
48 In this paragraph I want to turn to the third set of rules relevant for assessing corrupt
behaviour in perspective.  Beneath the layer of  statutes,  regulations and bureaucratic
hierarchies there is a complex web of interpersonal relationships amounting to a parallel
structure within the civil service running mainly along the lines of patron‑client and peer
relationships with its own rules in regard to corruption 20. These informal relationships
are regulated by a set of generally accepted rules, which are different from the official
rules and regulations.  They are very vague,  open to negotiation and not available to
outsiders. This observation holds to some extent for all bureaucracies throughout the
world. In my point of view bureaucracy in Malawi is different in two aspects. Firstly,
official rules are often extremely far removed from the actual situation on the office‑floor
that the emergence of an informal set of internal rules that amend or shortcut official
procedures  is  almost  inevitable  since  official  procedures  simply  do  not  work  in
complicated everyday life. Secondly, informal networks generally tend to be stronger and
more extended and the ability of the state to implement public policies and to enforce the
rule of law is weaker than in the West.
49 Between official regulations and daily practice there is often a glaring discrepancy, which
gives raise to the informal modus vivendi with its own rules. Civil servants have to come to
terms with official rules and procedures, patron‑client relationships at the office, their
obligations towards kith and kin and influence from interest groups and political parties.
In this paper official rules and regulations as the MPSR are conceptualised as external and
the informal rules in the bureaucracy as internal. Of course, the official regulations are
internal in the sense that they only apply to the civil service but civil servants themselves
do perceive them as external since they originate in the cabinet and the top of the civil
service. In contrast, the clandestine rules, which have the tendency to undermine official
rules, emerge from the social field of the bureaucracy itself.
50 It is not easy to escape the social control in the office which enforces these informal rules.
Many civil  servants I  have talked to emphasised the choking atmosphere of  distrust,
social control and strength of the unofficial code of conduct in the government' s offices.
Young  and  idealistic  officers  often  bemoaned  the  culture  of  corruption  and  low
motivation in the bureaucracy. Yet, it was unthinkable for them to resist social control
from colleagues and superiors. Open disagreement with superiors is a violation of the
office mores which is usually described in terms of 'respect to the master', ulemu kwa
bwana.  Resistance or rebellion would le ad to social  isolation,  considerable diminished 
career opportunities and restricted access to attractive posts and workshops. 
51 Social relations within the bureaucracy have two central features :  asymmetric power
relations and the maintenance of indebtedness. Junior civil servants usually draw a sharp
line between 'the bosses' and themselves who depend on protection by their superior
officers. Without the intervention of a patron or friend it is almost impossible to get a
salary advance, the permission to attend a workshop, to be promoted or even to get a job
in the first place. For example, in many government departments it is understood that
you have to  paya "commission" to  your superior  officer  if  you want  to get  a  salary
advance.  Indebtedness  is  the  other  important  aspect  of  relationships  inside  the civil
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service. Mr. Mashanga's story shows how personal relationships at the office produce and
reproduce indebtedness and katangale. The production and maintenance of indebtedness
is desirable for both parties, the debtor and the creditor. The interest of the creditor is
obvious : he or she gains influence over the debtor. Often full return is not in the interest
of the creditor who might want to maintain his position of power. But even the debtor
will often perceive of a debt as an as set. If it is not possible to become a creditor the next
best  thing is  the status of  a  debtor.  To have a debt  is  a  means to establish a  social
relationship with someone who might feel obliged towards the weaker party.
52 Obviously  there  exist  differences  between  different  departments  and  sub‑units  like
offices and schools.  Firstly,  the attitude towards corruption of  the officers heading a
sub‑unit usually sets the tone for the rest of the staff. 
53 This can be observed in Malawi generally where corruption has spread from the top to
the bottom since the early 1990s. One can speak of a democratisation of appropriation
that  has  been  taking  place  since  the  introduction  of  multi‑part  democracy  in  1994.
Secondly,  the functions of  the Fisheries  Department,  for  example,  are different  from
those of a primary school. Nevertheless there is a set of basic informal rules and codes,
which can be found to some extent in all ministries and departments down to the smaller
units of police posts, health posts and schools. Civil servants often allude euphemistically
to  these  rules  as  "know  how  to  manœuvre"  or  the  "rules  of  the  game".  The  most
important principle is  "respecting the boss",  kulemekeza or ulemu kwa bwana.  Another
important principle is kugawa/kugawira mentioned above. One of the obligations of the
bwana, the boss or master, is to ensure that his or her subordinates receive their share.
The boss who violates this principle might face some kind of silent resistance or revenge,
for example in the form of corruption allegations. Junior officers tend to tolerate or even
condone  corruption  by  the  superior  officers  as  long  as  it  is  katangale,  a  system  of
redistribution in which everybody involved benefits. This attitude of junior civil servants
is nicely illustrated in the song Ndiphike Nyemba by Charles Nsaku that was very popular
in  early  2002.  A  driver  accuses  his  boss  of  being  selfish,  "I  am your  driver,  we  left
Lilongwe together the previous day coming here to the field to work, there you are with
money boss, food you are just eating alone, while your driver ate two days ago". These
accusations of being selfish or ubombo are not something to be lightly taken in a society
where the obligation to share is a central principle of conduct. In the song Njoka mu udzu
by Lucius Banda the junior officer compares his boss to a snake lacking basic human
qualities : "You are like a snake in the grass, when passing us by you smile, deep down in
your heart you harbour bad feelings towards us, what is that you are missing boss ?" He
also warns his boss that one day he might have to depend on his subordinates since "life
is like a card game, today we are working for you but your children might be employed by
us".
54 Corruption is a normative concept rooted in the Weberian distinction between the public
office and the private sphere and is just one of several sets of rules co‑existing in the
Malawian  bureaucracy.  The  official  rules  suffer  from  a  lack  of  legitimacy,  they  are
experienced to be too far removed from the realities inside and outside the office. This
lack of recognition is not limited to lower level bureaucrats but also widespread among
superior officers, especially since democratisation in 1994 which has been a period of
profound changes in Malawian society. Moreover, enforcement of rules is hampered by
unclear mandates and lacking resources of controlling organisations such as the ACB,
often locked in competition against each other.
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55 Mr. Mashanga' s story illustrates the unpredictability and insecurity in civil  servants'
daily lives that often put them in difficult situations where violation of official rules is the
lesser evil. Obligations against kin and clients are felt very strongly and it is not easy to
resist taking advantage of the weak enforcement of the official rules. The social pressure
on civil servants is high since kinship ideology does not acknowledge the separation of
the public and the private sphere. Consequently, the idea of a misuse of the public office
for private ends has no place in kinship morality and it is difficult to justify a refusal to
assist by referring to official rules. Compliance to the social obligations is motivated by
the high degree of social control such as the threat of witchcraft, ufiti, and social isolation.
Moreover, everybody, even the privileged, has to take his or her own dependence on
assistance by others into account.
56 However,  two  qualifications  de  serve  emphasis.  Firstly,  one  should  not  assume  the
existence of one homogenous 'primordial realm' based on a authentic African identity
opposed  to  the  foreign  colonial  public  realm  of  the  state  institutions  which  lack
legitimacy. In fact, kinship is just one of man y alternative public realms with different
concepts about good conduct, which might even be mutually exclusive such as kinship
morality and charismatic Christian belief, for example. Secondly, civil servants are active
agents exploiting ambiguities and gaps resulting from legal pluralism. Even the lowest
civil servants occupy a relatively privileged position. This makes them important brokers
in their social networks and constantly people try to make claims on them by reminding
them of their social obligations. Thus, civil servants experience a tension between official
rules and their everyday lives. Neither can be ignored but the tension is reduced to an
acceptable level by the creation of a body of unofficial office rules. Primarily, this modus
vivendi  provides  a  matrix  for  the  application  of  official  rules.  Mr.  Mashanga's  case
illustrates this virtuous playing with different sets of rules to maintain one' s position
both, in the office and the "private" sphere.
57 An analysis that takes indigenous concepts such as katangale and kugawa into account
transcends  the  simple  public/private,  legal/illegal  dichotomies  abounding  in
non‑anthropological treatments of the phenomenon. The recognition of legal pluralism
in the bureaucracy of Malawi reveals alternative dichotomies such as selfish/altruistic
and different ideas of conformity and deviance that make it more difficult to believe in
the potential of universalistic concepts such as the rule of law and good governance for
curbing corruption. We would be better advised to have a closer look at the alternative
sets of rules and moral ideologies for guidance in approaching a phenomenon that is
neither inherent to African society nor the symptom of a mere dysfunctionality of an
inefficient bureaucratic machine.
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NOTES
1.Moore (2000/1978) : 1.
2.Boss ‑ it pleases you to see us reading newspapers and playing bawo [East‑African board
game] during lunch hour while you spend your time with hookers, enjoying and eating at
Ryall's [expensive hotel in Blantyre].
3.The image of the chameleon is very strong and rich resonating with stories and myths.
The chameleon is a morally ambiguous character in tales and myths from Malawi's past
(Schoffeleers & Roscoe 1985 : 17‑38). In postcolonial Malawian poetry the image of the
chameleon was used as a metaphor to depict survival strategies under the authoritarian
regime of Kamuzu Banda between the early 1960s and 1994 (Mapanje 1981). Lately the
image has been used to describe politics and politicians since democratisation in 1994
(Dzimbiri 1998, Englund 2002).
4.I adopt Boissevain's definition of a broker. See Boissevain (1974 : 147).
5.For example, Tilman (1970) and Klitgaard (1988) adopt an economic point of view
whereas Scott (1979) and Médard (1982) have a more political perspective on corruption.
For a recent quite exhaustive overview of various economic and political science
approaches see Heidenheimer & Johnston (2002).
6.And indeed salaries are generally quite low : the Most junior grades like security
guards, gardeners and messengers earn about US $ 20 per month. Extension workers and
primary school teachers earn between US $ 25 and US $ 30 per month. Even officers with
higher qualifications, like a diploma or a bachelor's degree, rarely earn more than US $ 50
per month : junior professional officers as secondary school teachers, for example. have a
monthly salary of $ 40. The highest grades, in the Superscale, earn roughly US $ 100 per
month.
7.Excluding European and US consultants hired by the World Bank who earn several
hundred US $ a day.
8.The analysis of everyday language has been identified as a useful tool in
anthropological research of corruption. See e.g. Blundo & Olivier de Sardan (2001b) on
the "popular semiology of corruption" in francophone West‑Africa.
9.For overviews on legal pluralism see e.g. von Benda‑Beckmann & Strijbosch (1986) ;
Merry (1988) ; Snyder (1993) ; Woodman (1998).
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10.On the history of the promotion of Chewa‑identity under Banda see Vail & White
(1991) and Kaspin (1995 : 602‑611).
11.On the differentiation between external rules and internal rules see Moore
(2000/1978.1973). This can be also conceptualised as the difference between "Iaw in the
books" and "Iaw in action" according to one of the founding fathers of legal
anthropology ; see Ehrlich (1967/1913).
12.Skinner (1963). See also World Bank (1994).
13.For an anthropological study of the implementation of the civil service reform see
Anders (2002b).
14.De Sousa Santos refers to this fragmentation of the state as internal legal pluralism or
interlegality (1995 : 281).
15.See the blueprint of bureaucratic authority by Max Weber (1990/1921) : 551‑ 579.
16.Malawi Government (1978/1991) Malawi Public Service Regulation : Book One, chapter
Il.
17.Ekeh points out that there exist two public realms in the postcolonial state; firstly. the
"primordial public" realm associated with traditional kinship relationships which is
"moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm" and secondly.
the "civic public" of the state's institutions based on the ideology of the colonial
administration. which is "amoral and lacks the generalised moral imperatives operative
in the private realm and in the primordial public" (1975 ; 92).
18.On the encounter between Christian missionaries and Africans which amounted to
more than mere colonisation since Africans also appropriated Christianity see e.g. Jean
and John Comaroff (1991/1997). For Malawi see McCracken (2000/1977).
19.Of course there are differences between the various Christian churches. Protestant
churches have a more pronounced tradition of being apolitical and recognising secular
power than the Catholic Church. Yet. most churches recognise secular laws and adhere to
the private/public distinction.
20.With an illustrative and evocative image Bayart refers to this characteristic of the
postcolonial state in Africa as rhizome thus emphasising the subterranean and informal
character of these parallel social and political networks which have penetrated the
rational bureaucratic machine (1993 ; 260‑272).
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